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Abstract 
Competition for financial and human resources continues to pressure 
Department of Defense (DoD) contracting organizations to accomplish their mission 
as efficiently and effectively as possible.  The contracting workforce shoulders the 
burden of balancing the goals of maximizing taxpayers’ value for money and 
reducing operating cost to the lowest reasonable level.  Ensuring the right mix of 
acquisition professionals with the right competencies for each mission is essential to 
meet this challenge.  This report is follow-on research to previous workforce model 
research (Reed, 2010), upon which this report relies substantially.  Reed (2010) 
provided a survey of existing DoD contracting workforce models.  This research 
seeks to identify best-in-class variables from the previous research as well as any 
opportunities for improvement identified during analysis of the models.  
Keywords:  Contracting, workforce, model, human capital, Army, 
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Statement of Research Issue/Results  
Identify best-in-class model variables from 2010 research on DoD contracting 
workforce models and identify the degree to which the variables account for required 
contracting workforce personnel.  Identify predictive variables that will allow for 


























This study, consistent with the previous work that it extends (Reed, 
2010), focuses on identifying methods used to assess the workload of government 
contracting personnel. Organizational success depends on ensuring that the correct 
number of human resources with the correct competencies is available to 
accomplish the mission. The increasing pace of change in the federal acquisition 
environment and intense pressure to cut operating budgets has increased the 
interest in the models available for use by contracting organizations. Organizations 
are seeking models to measure their workloads and assign adequate resources to 
effectively manage the workloads with acceptable levels of risk.  
Traditionally, contracting leaders manage the size of their workforce by simply 
filling vacancies that exist in their assigned manning documents or organization 
charts. The reality of today’s acquisition workforce environment is that it is 
increasingly difficult to fill organization vacancies with quality staff, let alone conduct 
rigorous analysis of workload and staffing requirements. However, the applicability of 
manning documents designed 10 or more years ago to the type and quantity of work 
being performed today is highly questionable. When government officials conduct 
workload assessments today,  they most often use measures such as dollars 
awarded or actions completed. The failure to include measures of organization size 
or the type or quality of the work performed results in little valuable insight into the 
actual work performed. The current acquisition landscape provides ample motivation 
for contracting leaders to ask the following: “What size should our contracting 
organization be?”  
I acknowledge at the outset that the answer to this quantitative question is not 
in itself sufficient for organizational success. It is not simply the number of workers 
but also the competencies of those workers that is essential in meeting mission 
requirements. While many other workforce initiatives and studies are investigating 
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assess workload and relative performance in contracting organizations as well as 
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II. An Ebb Tide 
Conventional wisdom holds that an increase of about 20,000 workers in the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition workforce is a necessity (Acquisition 
Advisory Panel, 2007; Gansler, 2007; DoD, 2010). Despite evidence supporting the 
case for increasing the contracting workforce, the constrained budget environment 
may cause contracting leaders to abandon their hopes to grow their workforce and 
instead increase the urgency with which they evaluate where they place their 
existing human capital.  With proposed policies that pivot away from workforce 
growth and toward replacing vacancies at a 1 fill per 2 vacancy rate, the importance 
of matching staff to mission requirements is increasing exponentially. 
The lack of an analytical foundation for many current staffing plans begs the 
following questions:  
 How do we know which service or buying office to assign limited 
accessions?  
 Which offices are currently adequately staffed, and which offices are 
critically understaffed?  
 What will be the most effective method to allocate any new accessions 
or positions to the offices with the greatest need?  
The desire for increased rigor in workforce models has become evident in 
recent years in the federal government. In 2009, the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy addressed the need for workload models and called for a process to facilitate 
workforce model development and assessment (OFPP, 2009). The Federal 
Acquisition Institute (FAI) has since established an online community that shares 
workload projection tools. In keeping with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s 
assessment that the most appropriate model may vary by agency, OFPP has made 
seven different model types available. The models available include the following:  
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 Program-based,  
 Multidimensional,  
 Regression,  
 Volume-based,  
 Transaction, and  
 Conceptual-combination models.  
All federal civilian agencies have a contracting representative member of the 
FAI modeling working group that can provide access to the various models. So far, 
the DoD does not have a similar working group to facilitate the sharing of model 
information. 
Despite the challenges identified in workload assessment and staffing, 
contracting leaders do have options available to measure their organization 
workload and relative performance.  I provide a brief summary of several ratios and 
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III. Option 1—Use a Ratio  
Over the past 30 years, many ratio-based measures of workload and 
performance have been developed (for summaries, see Reed, 2010, 2011). These 
ratios provide an opportunity to use established measures to analyze organization 
work and then compare the results to an existing set of baseline results. Three such 
ratios are discussed in the following sections. 
A. Purchasing and Procurement Workload Ratios and 
Measures  
The Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies (CAPS) works with industry 
supply management executives and academics to develop and share knowledge 
and best practices. These ratio baselines allow commercial purchasing 
organizations to compare themselves with other organizations (Wade, 2010). 
Among the 20 industry variables related to procurement that the CAPS track, 
there are three ratios that apply to both the public and private sectors, and which 
could easily be implemented to measure contracting organization work. 
The first ratio is the total dollars spent by a procurement organization as a 
percentage of the total firm/agency/DoD department budget (the proportion of an 
organization’s needs that are acquired via contract and  thus contracting’s relative 
impact/importance to the total organization). This allows leaders to convey 
contracting’s contribution to the overall organization/agency mission. 
The second ratio is the supply management operating expense as a 
percentage of total spend (how much does it cost to spend each dollar of supplies or 
services that the organization procures?). Cost-per-dollar-obligated (CPDO) ratios 
(also known as cost-to-spend ratios) allow a comparison to other organizations on 
the efficiency of the unit and for trend analysis of the organization’s performance 
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The government sector has found the CPDO benchmark  to be particularly 
useful. It is based on available information and is easy to understand. Further, dollar-
based calculations are less likely to cause government auditors to mistake increased 
efficiency (fewer orders) as a rationale for staff reductions (McCampell and Slaich, 
1995).  
Of course, CPDO ratios should be measured in a competitive environment (to 
ensure award prices are not kept high to improve the metric) and in an aggregated 
fashion, rather than applying the measure to individual buyers (aggregation should 
ensure there is no skewing by individuals attempting to pursue bad buying practices; 
Reed, 2010, 2011). A study of federal contracting organizations found that the 
average CPDO ratio was $0.0104, which is in the range found in the CAPS 
benchmarks ($0.002 to $0.05; Reed, 2010, 2011). 
Beyond baseline assessments, a CPDO ratio can serve as a useful 
outsourcing decision tool for your organization. For agencies that utilize fee-for-
service contracting services for portions of their workload, comparing the 
organization’s cost-per-dollar obligated to the fees charged by external groups 
(which may range from 0.75% to 8%) often provides a strong argument for 
enhancing internal capability rather than paying higher fees elsewhere.  
The third ratio is the total spend per supply management employee (contract 
dollars awarded by the average procurement specialist), which identifies the size of 
the portfolio that the average buyer can execute (ISM, 2010).  Average price levels 
of contract actions vary at different organizations and by the class of product or 
service purchased. This variability requires that comparisons using this measure be 
used only within similar groups or when controlling for the differences in price. 
An analysis of existing research (Reed, 2010) found the contract-dollars-
awarded-per-buyer measure to be superior to using either orders or actions-per-
buyer measures for several reasons.  Organizations often differ on the definition of 
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be manipulated by pursuing inefficient methods (issuing multiple orders rather than 
pursuing a more efficient consolidated order process). Conversely, auditors may 
conclude that a reduction in orders may provide a logical basis for staff reductions 
(McCampell and Slaich, 1995). 
A study of state contracting organizations found that the average dollar 
volume obligated annually per buyer was $10.7 million, which is in the range found 
in the CAPS benchmarks ($3.4 million in aerospace to $47.9 million for food service; 
McCampell and Slaich, 1995). The wide ranges in benchmarks illustrate the 
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IV. Measuring the Value of Organization 
Output 
Prior to discussing workload models, it is appropriate to observe that both 
ratios and models can provide information regarding how much work an organization 
accomplishes, but they rarely address how good the work is.  Whichever ratio or 
workload model is selected, it is important to recognize that the factor that often 
goes unmeasured is the quality of the contracting product. For example, an 
organization may produce a large volume of actions, or a large dollar total of 
contracts at a low operational cost, but these quantity measures do not capture the 
quality or value of the output.   
To address this shortcoming, researchers in the past have recommended 
measuring contracting organization outputs with performance unit costing (PUC; 
Sorber and Straight, 1989, 1991, 1995; Straight, 1999). This method considers the 
cost of operations relative to performance units. Performance units are completed 
actions adjusted for the level of the quality of the output. Examples of quality factors 
include the following:  
 Timely award,  
 Timely delivery,  
 Fair and reasonable prices,  
 Customer satisfaction, and  
 Compliance with laws and regulations.  
(Sorber and Straight, 1995) 
PUC is calculated by multiplying the number of output units (e.g., contract 
actions) by an achieved quality index (from 0.00 to 1) that is composed of some of 
the preceding quality factors. The result is the quantity of performance units. The 
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procurement organization to determine the cost per performance unit (Sorber and 
Straight, 1989, 1991, 1995; Straight, 1999).  For example, 900 units of output at an 
achieved quality index of 0.65 yields 585 performance units. If the procurement 
organization costs incurred were 10,000, then the cost per performance unit would 
be $17.09. Obtaining higher output levels while maintaining quality and cost would 
decrease the performance unit cost. Higher quality achieved at the same cost and 
output would also decrease PUC. The PUC methodology combines the resource 
perspective of the cost to run the organization with the quantity and quality of the 
work performed (Sorber and Straight, 1989, 1991, 1995; Straight, 1999).   
The important thing to remember is that the models and ratios discussed in 
this report may be able to indicate that an organization does  a lot of work efficiently, 
but only through the incorporation of PUC or some other quality output measure can 
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V. Option 2—Build a Process–Action 
Contracting Workload Model  
The use of ratios is attractive based on the relatively low effort required to 
compute them and ready availability of baseline comparisons. A second, more 
complex option for assessing contracting organization workload and performance is 
to utilize an existing workload model or develop a new model specific to the 
organization. While such models do require more work to develop and implement, 
they can be constructed to identify strategic priorities of the organization and to 
ensure that nuances of the work conducted are addressed in the models. Examples 
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VI. Analysis and Critique of DoD Workload 
Models 
Previous research (Reed, 2010, 2011) indicates that there are at least six 
evaluation criteria by which workload models might be evaluated. 
 Does the model reflect the strategic goals of the organization?  
 Does the model recognize the varying complexity of work in the 
organization?  
 Does the model include measures of value or quality of organization 
outputs? 
 Does the model provide actionable information? 
 Does the model provide functional ease of use? 
 Does the model allow for the projection of future workload based on 
leading indicators? 
In the following section, model examples from the three DoD services are 
presented, along with an assessment of the models on each of the criteria above.  
A. U.S. Army Workload Models 
The Army has primarily relied on a decentralized workload assessment 
process. This process allows the various commands to develop workload models 
for application within their organizations. 
An example of a model used by U.S. Army contracting organizations was 
developed by the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA).  
The AMSAA has been tasked with preparing manpower models for Army 
acquisition organizations since 1987. In 1999, the Army Materiel Command 
directed the AMSAA to baseline all functional areas in the acquisition process, 
including program management, staff/policy support, and contract administration. 
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Two clusters emerged based on the types of work accomplished: weapon system 
acquisition and installation/camp support. Different process action times (PATs) or 
task completion times were used in each of the two sectors (Reed, 2010). An 
example of the AMSAA model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Example of the AMSAA Model 
The primary workload factors used in the AMSAA model are (1) contract 
actions, (2) solicitations, (3) the ratio of competitive to non-competitive actions, and 
(4) the number of acquisition systems managed. Distinct process action times or 
task completion times were used to calculate process times for weapon system 
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An interesting aspect of this model is the weighting applied to completive 
actions. Based on a regression analysis of actions processed, the AMSAA has 
assigned a 4.5 multiplier to noncompetitive (e.g., sole source) contract actions. In 
other words, a noncompetitive action is credited for 4.5 times the process action time 
allowed for completion when compared with a competitive action. Despite its 
statistical foundation, observers have questioned the 4.5 multiplier factor, specifically 
whether the factor provides  an accurate assessment of work complexity in the sole 
source environment. The last complete model run was in 2006; however, Army 
Contracting Command has recently expressed a desire for updated high-level 
assessments (Reed, 2010, 2011).  
1. Assessment of Army Model 
 Does the Army model reflect the strategic goals of the organization?  
o It is difficult to determine, but apparently there is little or no 
direct tie to ACC or other Army contracting strategic goals. 
 Does the model recognize the varying complexity of work in the 
organization? 
o Yes, by capturing different types of actions.  However, the 
methodology and factors utilized for competitive and non-
competitive actions warrant further investigation. Further, 
because the process action times are now over a decade old, a 
revalidation of the model would be appropriate at this time.  
 Does the model include measures of value or quality of organization 
outputs? 
o Not at this time. 
 Does the model provide actionable information? 
o Yes, total earned process time hours and FTEs can be 
calculated with this model. 
 Does the model provide functional ease of use? 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 16 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Does the model allow for the projection of future workload based on 
leading indicators? 
o Not at this time.  Such a projection would require a move to 
future years defense program (FYDP) inputs or budget request 
information, rather than relying on solicitation and other contract 
action data. 
B. U.S. Navy Workload Models 
Naval Supply Systems Command uses the time to produce workload model 
to measure work accomplished. The model uses process action times developed by 
two subject matter expert groups: simplified acquisitions and large acquisitions. The 
time to produce model relies on data collected each month on completed actions. 
The data set includes product and service definitions of each contracting action. The 
data are placed into simplified acquisition or large acquisition buckets.  
A separate productivity model measures the actual productivity of the 
contracting specialists via a tally of completed simplified and large-contract actions. 
Complexity is accounted for in this model by placing more complex actions in the 
large acquisition bucket, irrespective of the dollar level.  
Both the TTP model and the productivity model can be used to assess 
activity at the FISC-wide level, at the aggregate FISC level, or at the individual 
operating location (Reed, 2010). However, due to the wide variability in average 
productivity per year and the wide variability in the nature of work performed, the 
models are used to compare year-over-year performance trends at individual 
locations rather than to assess each location’s capability relative to other locations 
(Reed, 2010, 2011).   
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Figure 2. Example of the TTP Model 
1. Assessment of Navy Models 
 Do the Navy models reflect the strategic goals of the organization?  
o It is difficult to determine, but apparently there is little or no 
direct tie to Navy contracting strategic goals. 
 Do the models recognize  the varying complexity of work in the 
organization?  
o Yes. The models use different buckets of complexity, as well as 
levels of competition.  More complex actions are placed in the 
large (complex) acquisition action bucket. 
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o Not at this time. 
 Do the models provide actionable information? 
o Yes, total earned process time hours and FTEs can be 
calculated with this model.  However, the Navy is reluctant to 
utilize the output information on an enterprise level.  Use of the 
data is currently restricted to identifying trend comparisons for 
individual operating location organizations over time. 
 Do the models provide functional ease of use? 
o Yes, inputs are from archive data and other existing monthly 
data. 
 Do the models allow for the projection of future workload based on 
leading indicators? 
o Not at this time.  Such a projection would require a move to 
FYDP or budget request information, rather than relying on 
other contract action data. 
C. U.S. Air Force Workload Models 
In 2001, the U.S. Air Force published a manpower standard for operational 
(base-level) contracting (AFMIA, 2001) that recognizes key workload indicators such 
as dollars obligated and total actions completed. It also recognizes that large dollar 
actions are more complex than small dollar actions and, as such, rewards more 
process time credit for actions above $100,000 than for those below $100,000. The 
model also recognizes the burden of military deployment responsibilities and the 
importance of the support roles of the contracting organization, and it awards 
manpower for government purchase card oversight, small business program 
administration, commander’s support staff, and IT support.  
Air Force manpower experts developed the process time standards by 
recognizing over 150 individual types of activity in the procurement process and at 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 19 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
The manpower standard workload formulas can be inserted into standard 
spreadsheet software applications for ease of computation. However, the parsing of 
data required to translate existing data into a useable format (e.g., the elimination of 
non-qualifying contract activity) can be burdensome.  
Because the Air Force model is more robust in many ways when compared to 
other agency models, it has been favored as the model of choice by many in non–Air 
Force DoD agencies and has become the default model used in joint basing 
workload transfer negotiations. Despite the praise this model has received from 
many users, criticism for the standard has grown in recent years. Of particular note 
is that the manpower formula is outdated because it is based on the mean (or 
average) time for executing activities in 1998. Critics of this model identify 
characteristics of the changing contracting landscape as concerns (e.g., 
management and oversight of the acquisition of services process, performance-
based service  contracts, the standard procurement system, competitive sourcing for 
multiple installation support, increased post-award contract administration, the  
burden of service contracts on installation contracting offices, strategic sourcing 
efforts that require much more pre-award activity in order to develop commodity 
strategies, and the increased contingency deployments; Reed, 2010).   
In addition, the types of work that receive no credit in the Air Force model 
are a concern for many. For example, there is no credit given for dollars obligated 
or actions processed that are modifications to contracts, nor for processing orders 
off of centralized contracts, nor for awarding or processing utility contracts. The 
work associated with these efforts can be substantial, yet it is not credited in the 
Air Force model. The rationale for withholding credit is that post-award and order 
processing was built in to the original time standards. In other words, in the 
manpower standard, when an organization is given credit for awarding a contract, it 
also earn all the necessary manpower to administer the contract. The changes in 
complexity and number of these types of actions since 1998, and the tremendous 
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question whether the original built-in process times are still an accurate reflection 
of the actual time required to complete the activities today. A final critique of the Air 
Force model is that it is perceived to be similar to the time and motion studies 
conducted in the mid-twentieth century. Time and motion studies focus on 
increasing the efficiency in a process and measuring the time required to complete 
tasks. Although the models measure the time required to accomplish process 
tasks, they do not take into account the quality of the outputs that result from the 
process. 

















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 21 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
1. Assessment of Air Force Operational Model  
 Does the Air Force operational model reflect the strategic goals of the 
organization?  
o It is difficult to determine, but apparently there is little or no 
direct tie to current Air Force contracting strategic goals. 
 Does the model recognize the varying complexity of work in the 
organization?  
o Yes. The models use different buckets of complexity; however, 
the buckets may not reflect the current task environment and 
need further evaluation and revision. 
 Does the model include measures of value or quality of organization 
outputs? 
o Not at this time. 
 Does the model provide actionable information? 
o Yes, total earned FTEs can be calculated with this model. 
 Does the model provide functional ease of use? 
o Somewhat. Inputs are from archive and monthly data.  
However, a great deal of manipulation and cleansing of data is 
required. 
 Does the model allow for the projection of future workload based on 
leading indicators? 
o Not at this time.  Such a projection would require a move to 
FYDP or budget request information, rather than relying on 
dollar obligations and other contract action data. 
D. The Air Force Systems Contracting Model 
Separate and distinct from the Air Force operational manpower standard is 
the Air Force workload assessment model(WAM) for weapon systems contracting 
developed by the Aeronautical System Center at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, 
Ohio. This model (see Figure 4) relies on stakeholder assessments of the number of 
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may earn 245 hours to complete a sole source contract from $1 million to $5 million 
but earn 575 hours to complete a contract from $25 million to $50 million. Similar 
threshold-based earned hours are awarded in service contract, competitive contract, 
and delivery order categories as well. There are 16 modification types (e.g., 
supplemental agreements, funding actions); 10 undefinitized contract types (e.g., 
letter contracts, terminations, option exercises); 15 definitization actions (e.g., task 
order, delivery order, undefinitized contract action); and eight miscellaneous actions 
(e.g., Freedom of Information Act requests, congressional inquiries). Stakeholder 
groups meet to assign process times for each of these types of work (Reed, 2010).  
Workload is determined through an annual data call exercise in which each 
buyer on the installation completes a spreadsheet by simply identifying the contract 
or program he or she is working on and then identifying—via dropdown boxes—
general information regarding the type and level of the work.  
The assigned hours earned are not displayed to the buyers, and all 
workload assessment computations are calculated after submission. The data are 
aggregated through contracting offices and reviewed by contracting leaders so that 
they can concur with the input (Reed, 2010). The data are further refined by 
assigning earned credit based on where the action is within the acquisition cycle. 
In other words, buyers earn partial credit for completing any of the 12 different 
portions of larger tasks of work in progress (e.g., 25% of related task hours for 
reaching RFP issued, or 70% for negotiations complete). 
Further refinements occur based on the complexity factor assigned to the 
program office. The contracting directorate conducts  stakeholder discussions, and 
considers factors such as congressional visibility, program maturity, higher 
headquarters or Program Executive Office review thresholds, technical complexity, 
personnel mix and history, and so forth, to determine an indirect multiplier factor to 
add  to the workload input in order to compensate for additional workload complexity 
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Figure 4. Air Force Workload Assessment Model 
 WAM relies on individual procurement specialists to accurately input their 
workload, determine the appropriate complexity level for the work, and determine 
the degree of completion of the total effort. In addition, it does not account for types 
or grades of workforce personnel. Forty hours earned through an action covers 
one FTE for a week, whether it is a GS-9 with two years of experience or a GS-13 
with twenty years of experience. To account for variability in grade structure, in 
cases where  a contracting office has a significant departure from the normal 
distribution of grade levels, the indirect complexity factor is designed to 
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1. Assessment of Air Force Systems Contracting Model 
 Does the Air Force systems contracting model reflect the strategic 
goals of the organization?  
o It is difficult to determine, but apparently there is a link to Air 
Force Materiel Command priorities. 
 Does the model recognize the varying complexity of work in the 
organization?  
o Yes. The model uses many different buckets of complexity and 
is developed with a great deal of granularity so that task types 
are captured by complexity and degree of completion. 
 Does the model include measures of value or quality of organization 
outputs? 
o Not at this time. 
 Does the model provide actionable information? 
o Yes, total earned FTEs can be calculated with this model, 
although variance in grade level and competency level require 
further refinement. 
 Does the model provide functional ease of use? 
o Somewhat. Inputs are from an annual data call.  While individual 
entry of data by all contracting personnel requires additional 
effort compared to use of archived data, it results in a real-time 
assessment of complexity and work completion. 
 Does the model allow for the projection of future workload based on 
leading indicators? 
o To some degree.  The model does not project future (not 
currently assigned) work.  However, unlike other models, it does 
capture work in progress and the degree of completion of that 
work.  Given the long total process times that are sometimes 
involved in weapon system contracting, such an assessment 
may equate to a de facto future work assessment for many in 
the systems contracting workforce.  Further, as major weapon 
systems are generally much more clearly defined in out-year 
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may lend themselves well to improved future projections in the 
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VII. Six Steps for Contracting Leaders 
There is a wide variety of ratios, benchmarks, and models available to serve 
as the basis for government contracting workload assessment. However, most of the 
attention on contracting workload and performance to date has been on the number 
of actions or dollars awarded. These overly broad measures are incapable of 
answering the critical questions: How much work do we or will we need to do, and 
how well do we do it? Understanding the competencies and capabilities of an 
organization assists managers in developing a mixed human capital strategy; 
however, leaders cannot determine the mix of competencies required without also 
determining the number of workers needed. The two factors affect each other with 
such great significance that to consider one in the absence of the other is an 
endeavor destined for failure. 
There are concrete actions that contracting leaders can take toward 
answering the questions above.  The following six steps can be taken at the lowest 
implementation cost to provide leaders with immediate assessment of their workload 
and staffing: 
1. Define your strategic intent and identify quality measures that reflect 
your intent (e.g., timely award, timely delivery, fair and reasonable 
prices, customer satisfaction, corrective actions). 
2. Conduct a CPDO analysis for the previous fiscal year for your 
organization. If you do not have access to all operating expenses (and 
many leaders do not), use the salary cost of the workforce as your 
operating cost.  
3. If you prefer the more tailored, precise (and more time-consuming) 
process action model alternative, develop or select a model to use, 
populate it, and run the model calculations. 
4. Measure the quality of your outputs (consistent with your strategic 
intent) now and over time to determine trends and averages. 
5. Compare your organization to industry benchmarks and to similar 
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between your CPDO and the benchmarks. What are the potential 
explanations for the differences? Involve stakeholders such as 
organization commanders and office directors to add contextual details 
to provide a more comprehensive understanding. 
6. Identify an estimate of your future work. This remains one of the most 
difficult tasks. Budget proposals, future years defense programs, 
program objective memoranda, and appropriations legislation may 
provide information upon which to construct rough order estimates to 
predict future work.  Predictions may either relate to  the total amount 
of work expected or the departure trend from previous-year obligations 
that your organization may experience. Develop complexity and risk 
assessment weights based on the type of monetary obligations and 
product/service mix that your organization is projected to procure.  
Workload models and ratios can provide useful information regarding the 
contracting organization. However, the results should never be used as the single 
factor to assess or compare an organization without also considering other 
contextual information regarding the differences that exist among groups. By taking 
the six steps mentioned previously, contracting leaders will begin to gain valuable 
insight into the amount and nature of the work their organization is to perform as well 
as information regarding the actual performance of the work. Further, taking these 
actions it will allow for the development of quality measures linked to leaders’ 
strategic intent and for the establishment of quality performance goals for the 
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